Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (3/341)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

Grant that, were it not for the cause that necessitates its existence, it would not exist. Yet this is an impossible supposition, for the cause is necessarily existent in itself, and this essence is one of its inseparable concomitants. An inseparable concomitant of that which is necessarily existent in itself cannot be nonexistent, because the nonexistence of the concomitant entails the nonexistence of that from which it necessarily follows. Thus, if a concomitant of the necessarily existent were nonexistent, the necessarily existent would also be nonexistent. But its nonexistence is impossible, so the nonexistence of its concomitant is likewise impossible. The nonexistence of this essence is therefore impossible, not possible: possibility is the opposite of impossibility, and if its nonexistence is impossible, it cannot be possible.

[The fourth aspect]

It may be said:

It is known that, were it not for the existence of the agent, this essence would be nonexistent in itself; its nonexistence would not be the effect of a cause separate from it.

As for the statement, “The cause of nonexistence is the nonexistence of the cause”: if what is meant is that the nonexistence of the cause entails the nonexistence of this essence and indicates it, this is correct. But if what is meant is that the very nonexistence of the cause is what made the effect nonexistent ن, then sound reason plainly recognizes this as false. Pure nonexistence has no effect on anything whatsoever. Moreover, when something exists only through another, and that other does not exist, it remains nonexistent, continuing in its previous state. Such continuing nonexistence has no cause whatsoever. Were one to suppose that everything nonexistent has a cause for its nonexistence, one would have to posit infinitely many causes, since there is no end to what may be supposed nonexistent. All of this is false, for nonexistence is pure negation, not anything at all in which causes and effects could be posited.

This being so, a contingent being requires a cause only when its existence is supposed. If its nonexistence is supposed instead, it requires nothing whatsoever. Thus, if its existence is supposed to be necessary through another, with an eternal, beginningless necessity, there is nothing here that admits of nonexistence, nor can its essence be considered together with the condition that its cause does not exist.

وهب انه لولا السبب الموجب لها لعدمت لكن هذا تقدير ممتنع فإن السبب واجب الوجود بذاته وهي من لوازمه ولازم الواجب بذاته يمتنع عدمه لأن عدم اللازم يوجب عدم الملزوم فلو عدم لازم الواجب لعدم الواجب وعدمه ممتنع فعدم لازمه ممتنع فكان عدم هذه الذات ممتنعاً فلا يكون عدمها ممكناً، فإن الممكن نقيض الممتنع وإذا كان عدمها ممتنعاً لم يكن ممكناً. [الوجه الرابع] أن يقال: معلوم أنه لولا وجود الفاعل لكانت معدومة بنفسها ولم يكن عدمها معلول علة منفصلة عنها. وقول القائل: علة العدم عدم العلة: إن أراد به أن عدم العلة يستلزم عدمها ويدل عليه، فهذا صحيح وإن أراد أن نفس عدم العلة هو الذي جعل المعلول معدوماً ن فهذا معلوم البطلان بصريح العقل فإن العدم المحض لا يكون له تأثير في شيء أصلاً ولأن ما لا يوجد إلا بغيره إذا لم يوجد الغير فهو باق على العدم مستمر على ما كان عليه والعدم المستمر الباقي لا يكون له علة أصلاً ولو قدر أن لكل معدوم علة لعدمه للزم تقدير علل لا تتناهى لأن ما يقدر عدمه لا يتناهى، وكل هذا باطل، فإن العدم نفي محض، ليس بشيء أصلاً حتى يقدر فيه علل ومعلولات. وإذا كان كذلك، فالممكن لا يفتقر إلى المؤثر إلا إذا قدر وجوده وإلا فمع تقدير عدمه لا يفتقر إلى شيء أصلاً فإذا قدر وجوده واجباً بغيره وجوباً قديماً أزلياً لم يكن هناك ما يقبل العدم ولا يمكن أن يقرن بذاته شرط عدم علته.