If it is said, “He has established this elsewhere,” the answer is twofold:

First, the unsoundness of what he has said has also been demonstrated elsewhere.

Second, even supposing that he establishes it, this premise is undoubtedly disputed by many rational people—indeed, by most of them. It is an obscure premise requiring explanation.

The philosophically inclined Ash'arīs, such as al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī, are perplexed about it: al-Rāzī holds two positions on it, while al-Āmidī suspends judgment. All proponents of affirmation, such as al-Ash'arī and others, agree that it is invalid. How, then, can such a premise be used to establish the Necessary Existent, whose existence is more evident and better known than this premise? Is proving the strong by means of the weak anything other than defining the evident by means of the obscure? If this is unacceptable in definitions, it is even more deserving of rejection in proofs.

[The second aspect]

This is invalid on every view.

On the view of Sunni theorists, who say that the existence of each thing in external reality is identical with its reality, this is evident.

As for those who say that the nonexistent is a thing, distinguishing between existence and reality, they say this only of the nonexistent. They do not say that the reality of the eternally existent admits of either existence or nonexistence. They may say that the essence of the eternally existent differs from its existence, but they do not say that it admits of either existence or nonexistence.

In short,