and explicitly stated that only what admits of existence and nonexistence can be contingent. He then contradicted himself here, as has been explained at length elsewhere.

[Return to Ibn Sīnā’s statement]

We shall draw attention to this here. He says:

“Every existent, when considered in terms of its own essence without regard to anything else, either necessarily exists in itself or does not. If it necessarily exists, then it is the Real in itself, whose existence is necessary by virtue of its own essence, and it is the Self-Subsisting Sustainer. If it does not necessarily exist, it cannot be said to be impossible in itself after it has been assumed to exist. Rather, if consideration of its essence is coupled with a condition, such as the absence of its cause, it becomes impossible; if coupled with the condition that its cause exists, it becomes necessary.

“If, however, no condition is attached to its essence—neither the presence nor the absence of a cause—then, by virtue of its own essence, the third alternative remains: contingency. Considered in terms of its essence, it is thus something neither necessary nor impossible. Every existent, therefore, is either necessary in existence by virtue of its own essence or contingent in existence with respect to its own essence.”

[Commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s statement]

In response, we say: As for the division of existents into the necessary, which is necessary in itself ن, and the contingent, which exists through another, and the fact that whatever exists through another must depend upon something that exists through itself—all this is true, and these are true propositions.