If one signifies the essence, then so does the other; otherwise, neither does. It is therefore impermissible to regard one as conveying a conception of the reality while the other does not. At most, one may say that one expression gives more detail about certain attributes than the other.

For when someone says “rational animal,” the specific term “rational” explicitly signifies rationality in a way that the term “human being” does not.

The reply is: likewise, the specific term “growing” explicitly signifies growth in a way that the term “animal” does not, yet you do not require this. The same applies to the terms “sentient” and “moving voluntarily.” It is thus clear that their discourse does not refer to an intelligible, existing reality, but merely to stipulation, convention, arbitrary assertions, and mental constructs. This is discussed at length elsewhere.

Likewise, the distinction drawn by the Kullābiyyah and their followers between intrinsic attributes and qualitative attributes inseparable from the essence rests on stipulation, convention, arbitrary assertions, and mental constructs—not on an established external reality. This is why they are inconsistent in distinguishing intrinsic from qualitative attributes.

One says that He is beginningless by virtue of an attribute of beginninglessness, and everlasting by virtue of an attribute of everlastingness; another disputes the former or the latter.

The denier of attributes says: “He is knowing by virtue of His essence and powerful by virtue of His essence,” just as these others say that He is everlasting by virtue of His essence and beginningless by virtue of His essence.

If by this he means that His knowledge is inseparable from His essence and depends on nothing else, then he has