a complete conception of the thing described. Rather, every conception admits of a more complete conception, for the attributes of the thing described are not confined to those they have mentioned.

If they say, “We mean a complete conception of the essential attributes,” the demand to distinguish between the two arises again, leaving the argument circular.

This is just as they say, “The quiddity of a thing is composed of its essential attributes,” and then say, “Essential attributes are those upon which the realization of the quiddity depends, or upon which its conception depends.” Thus, an essential attribute cannot be understood until the quiddity is understood, nor can the quiddity be understood until its essential attribute is understood. The argument therefore remains circular.

Likewise, they make essential attributes parts of the quiddity that constitute it and are actually prior to it in both mental and extramental existence, although the essence has a greater claim to precedence than the attributes—if any precedence is assumed to exist at all. Otherwise, the two are inseparable.

If it is said, “They are parts,” the reply is: “If they are substances, then a single substance would be many substances; if they are accidents, then they are attributes.”

Thus, if it is said, “A human being is a rational animal,”