Abī Mūsā and others like him, and Judge Abū Bakr and those who followed him, such as Judge Abū Yaʿlā and others like him.

Their distinction is also invalid. To their assertion, “The essence cannot be conceived while that attribute is denied,” we reply:

The term “conception” is ambiguous. It may mean a conception of some kind—awareness of the conceived object through its existence—or it may mean complete conception. Whatever is conceived, a more complete conception of it is possible.

This is where error has crept into the reasoning of these mistaken logicians and of this group as well. If they mean a complete conception of the essence that exists in external reality and possesses inseparable attributes, then it cannot be conceived as it actually is while those attributes are denied. If “quiddity” means what someone conceives in his mind, then it becomes more or less complete according to the conceptions formed by different minds.

If, however, they mean what exists in external reality, it cannot exist without all its inseparable attributes. If they mean that it cannot be conceived in any respect while these attributes are denied, this objection applies equally to what they classify as essential, such as its being self-subsisting, eternal without beginning, and the like.

For someone may form some conception of the essence without these notions ever entering his mind; indeed, even