the proofs demonstrating that the totality of contingent things depends on something outside itself applies to every conceivable form, whether they are assumed to form a regress of coexisting things or of successive things; and whether, in succession, the first is assumed not to exist when the second exists, or to remain after the second comes into existence, except concurrently with it, neither before nor after.

Likewise, if they are assumed to coexist, some are neither before nor after others, and some exist before or after others. Whatever conceivable arrangement is assumed in a regress of causes, the proofs mentioned invalidate all of it and demonstrate its impossibility. Thus, what Ibn Sīnā mentioned is sufficient for this purpose, without the additions made by al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī.

Third:

Since contingent things need something outside themselves that is not contingent, but necessarily existent in itself, its nonexistence is impossible and its existence necessary. Thus, establishing the existence of the Necessary Being is itself sufficient to establish that it continues to exist while the contingent exists; there is no need for that Necessary Being.

Fourth:

What they mentioned about the contingent depending on the Necessary Being: its dependence on it is not confined to certain times—that the Necessary Being.

Al-Rāzī also said, when explaining Ibn Sīnā’s method for establishing the existence of the Necessary Being