must be distinguishable from anything else.”

If it is said, “Among things that are nonexistent, one is distinguishable from another, according to those who hold that what is nonexistent is a thing,” then one would have to demonstrate that what is nonexistent is not a thing. Establishing the Maker’s existence would thus depend on refuting their position, as a group of theologians have done.

It is well known that refuting this is subtler than refuting the notion that something whose existence does not derive from itself could exist through neither itself nor anything else. For it is plainly evident to everyone that whatever does not exist through itself must owe its existence to something else. As for supposing something existent whose existence derives neither from itself nor from anything else, this is impossible. To say that something exists through itself does not mean that it brought itself into existence, since the impossibility of this is well known. Rather, it means that its existence does not depend on anything else: its existence is necessary in itself, and it therefore exists eternally, without beginning or end. The truth of this statement and the falsity of its contrary are more evident than the arguments used to establish it. Indeed, further questions could be raised here that would prolong the discussion.

Al-Rāzī also said:

“Ibn Sīnā ought, before this section, to have explained that the cause of a contingent thing cannot precede it in time. For if that were possible, nothing would prevent each contingent thing from being attributed to another before it, without there being a first. He does not regard this as impossible, so how could he refute it in order to establish the Necessary Existent?

“But if it is demonstrated that the cause must exist alongside its effect, then, were there an infinite regress, all those causes and effects would exist together simultaneously, which he regards as impossible.