distinct from these of which it could be said, “It is necessary in itself.” Thus, there can be nothing here that is necessary in itself.

Others have refuted this possibility in two ways. The first, mentioned by al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī, is that whatever causes the totality causes each of its parts. Thus, if one part of the totality were assumed to be its cause, that part would necessarily cause itself, making the contingent thing both cause and effect.

Furthermore, that part is itself caused. If it were what makes the totality necessary, it would also be what makes its own cause necessary, and would therefore be the cause of its own cause.

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Neither Ibn Sīnā nor anyone else mentioned ruling out circular causation when establishing the Necessary Existent, just as the majority did not mention ruling out an infinite regress, since its invalidity is evident.

We have explained more than once that when a premise is known—for example, our knowledge that whatever comes into being must have an originator, or indeed our knowledge that this particular thing which has come into being has an originator—knowledge of that premise suffices to establish the conclusion sought. Objections raised against known truths belong to the endless class of sophistical objections. We must therefore distinguish between premises that are obscure to most people and require explanation, and premises that are known to most people, against which the objections raised are merely sophistical.

Since the practitioners of speculative theology frequently raise—and have raised against them—objections of this sophistical kind, such as those raised by unbelievers who dispute with falsehood in order thereby to refute