namely, that the totality is distinct from the individual members, that it may become necessary through the successive individual members, and other objections discussed above.

As for the third possibility—that the totality has a cause which is one of its parts—he refuted it by saying that no individual member has a stronger claim to this role than another, if each of them is caused, and that its own cause has a stronger claim to that role.

These are two arguments establishing this point. The first is that, if every part is contingent, including the collective configuration, there is no stronger reason for the totality to be made necessary by one part rather than another, since it depends on each and every part. The second is that each of those parts is caused by something else, so its cause has a stronger claim than it does to be what makes the whole necessary, whether the cause of the totality is said to be one specified member or an unspecified member among them.

If, however, each and every member is said to be its cause, this is even more untenable, since it entails two independently sufficient causes producing a single effect, which is impossible according to plain reason and the agreement of rational people.

If it is said: The totality is the parts and their combination itself, so it has no need of anything separate.

The reply is: This amounts to saying that it is necessary in itself, which has already been refuted. For each part would be contingent in itself, and the combination would be contingent in itself, and there would be nothing here