This is the third objection, expressed in his statement: “What prevents the aggregate—that is, the totality—from having its existence determined by its constituent members, not by any single one of them, but through each of its members having its existence determined by another, without end?”

He answered this by saying: “The aggregate of the individual members is the very totality posited. This entails a thing determining its own existence, which is impossible.”

This is the objection he mentioned in his other book, where he stated that he knew of no answer to it: “What prevents its existence from being determined through that of its individual members, with each member’s existence determined by another, without end?” He said: “This is a difficult objection; perhaps someone else has a solution to it.”

The answer attributed to him is valid only if, by the totality, they mean each and every constituent part, attribute no additional reality to their combination, and regard that combination as a part. In that case, one may say that the totality is the individual members themselves. But if by the totality they mean the combination—that is, the collective configuration—and hold that its existence is determined by the successive individual members, then the answer is not valid.