analogous to the first—indeed, it is the very same objection, merely expressed differently. For someone who denies the existence of anything called a totality in an infinite series does not dispute the existence of each of the successive individual members. Thus, if he grants the concept of a totality in an infinite series but interprets it as the successive individual members, he maintains his original denial. Some people, however, say that a totality is conceivable only in a finite series, while others may dispute whether a totality has any reality distinct from each individual member. This is why he treated them as two objections.

In any event, if the objection is valid, it strengthens the argument; if it is not valid, it cannot count as an objection at all. This is because, if the totality has no reality distinct from each individual member, there is no aggregate, distinct from those members, that we need to characterize as necessary or contingent. All those members are contingent, so the argument requires fewer premises on this supposition. For if the totality is distinct from the individual members, it is necessary to rule out its being necessary either through itself or through those members. But if no such distinction is posited, this is unnecessary: there is no need to rule out its being necessary either through itself or through the individual members.

Hence his statement in the objection: “If the totality is not distinct from the individual members, it does not follow that it must have a cause other than the cause of those members.”

This strengthens the argument. For if the totality has no cause other than the cause of the individual members, and it is known that a cause for those members must be established, that alone suffices. By contrast, if it is distinct from the individual members, it is necessary to rule out its being necessary either through itself or through those members.