that what one conceives in the mind may exist in external reality or may fail to exist. Thus, whether a contingent being is considered in the mind or in external reality, it can be contingent only if it admits nonexistence at one time and existence at another.

Whatever is necessarily nonexistent, such as the conjunction of two contradictories, cannot be contingent ن. Nor can whatever exists necessarily—namely, that which is beginninglessly eternal—be contingent. All philosophers—Aristotle and all his earlier and later followers—as well as rational thinkers have agreed on this. If something necessarily exists at all times, whether through itself or through another, there is no contingent being here that can be said to admit both existence and nonexistence.

When al-Rāzī and others followed Ibn Sīnā’s approach in establishing the contingency of such a being, they fell into confusion over the notion of a contingent being and faced numerous difficulties concerning it, as can be found in their books. Among these are the arguments al-Rāzī presented in his Muhassal against the existence of this kind of contingent being. He had no answer to them except his claim that the contingency of anything subject to change is self-evident.

Most rational thinkers disagree with him on this claim, including Aristotle and his followers ن. The point we have drawn attention to is one of the arguments establishing that every contingent being is preceded by nonexistence ن. Everything other than Allah is contingent; therefore, everything other than Allah comes into existence after nonexistence ن, as has been explained at length in its proper place.