For this reason, this position is not found among any rational thinkers before these men, nor have writers on sects and doctrines attributed it to any group. It is found only in the writings of these thinkers and their followers.

Once this is understood, if these thinkers say, “By this we mean future nonexistence—that is, it admits ceasing to exist in the future,” the reply is: “This invalidates your position.” For something that is necessary through another and beginninglessly eternal does not admit nonexistence, either in the past or in the future. Likewise, according to you, being beginninglessly eternal, it is also everlasting, and you regard its nonexistence as impossible.

If it is said, “We mean that what is conceived in the mind can exist in external reality or can fail to exist,” the reply is: “If it is beginninglessly eternal and necessary through another, it cannot admit nonexistence under any circumstances, and therefore cannot be contingent.” For a contingent being cannot be contingent unless it is nonexistent in the past or the future.

When it is said, “A contingent being admits existence and nonexistence,” we do not mean that it admits both simultaneously, for that would combine two contradictories. Rather, what is meant is that it admits existence instead of nonexistence, and nonexistence instead of existence. Thus, if it is nonexistent, it admits remaining nonexistent and beginning to exist; if it exists, it admits continuing to exist. If it is nonexistent, it admits remaining nonexistent and beginning to exist; if it exists, it admits continuing to exist and ceasing to exist. This is when its condition in external reality is considered. If its condition in the mind is considered, what is meant is