and it is not nonexistent while it exists—then, to explain what it means for it to admit existence and nonexistence, one of two things may be said:

Either the essence conceived in the mind can exist in external reality or can be nonexistent; or this reality can be nonexistent in external reality. If we consider the case of its nonexistence, it is said that it can exist after having been nonexistent. If, instead, we consider it while it exists, it is said that it can cease to exist after having existed.

Such a possibility is precluded for a beginninglessly eternal essence whose existence is necessary and whose nonexistence is impossible, whether its necessity is supposed to be through itself or through another. Likewise, those who describe the Lord’s attributes as contingent, despite their being beginninglessly eternal and necessary by virtue of the essence, hold that their nonexistence is impossible and that they do not admit it. For all rational people agree that whatever necessarily exists beginninglessly cannot cease to exist.

For whatever must be beginninglessly eternal can only be necessary through itself, and not through another; it is not beginninglessly eternal, as all rational people agree.