Even if this is conceded, it is comparable to supposing that the existence of the Necessary Existent is additional to its essence. Clearly, this does not entail that its essence admits of nonexistence.

It may then be said:
The expression “an essence considered in itself” supposes an essence abstracted from existence and nonexistence. Such a supposition is intrinsically impossible, for if an essence is supposed to be realized, it must either exist or not exist. It therefore cannot be supposed to exist in external reality in an abstracted state, such that one could say: “That essence admits of existence while nonexistent.” It therefore cannot be supposed to exist in external reality in an abstracted state, such that one could say: “That essence admits of existence and nonexistence.”

Furthermore, if it is said that an essence can be supposed in such an abstracted state, this is possible only for an essence that can either exist or not exist. But where existence belongs necessarily to an essence and is beginninglessly eternal, with nonexistence impossible, how can it conceivably be said that this essence admits of nonexistence when it has always been necessarily existent? There is no time at which it admits of nonexistence. If it is supposed in an abstracted state in the mind, this mentally conceived essence is not the essence existing in external reality that necessarily entails beginninglessly eternal existence.

If it is said:
“This is just as we say that the essence of a temporally originated being admits of existence and nonexistence.”

The reply is:
“If it is conceded to you that the essence of a temporally originated being is additional to its existence—while you agree with all other rational people that it cannot be realized in external reality unless it exists,