the latter, it cannot depend on anything distinct from it. As for its dependence on itself or on a part of itself, this does not contradict its independence of anything distinct from it.

Thus, the aggregate of existing beings, some necessary and others contingent, is not contingent under this interpretation. Rather, it is necessary, since it does not depend on anything distinct from it.

If it is said:

“The aggregate is necessary in itself because it is necessary through that which is necessary in itself,”

or:

“It is necessary in itself,”

meaning that it contains something necessary in itself, while all the rest have their needs met by that which is necessary in itself, then the aggregate is necessary through one of its parts. What is necessary through one of its parts falls, in this respect, within the category of what is necessary in itself. The fallacy in the objector’s argument thus becomes evident.

He is then told:

When you say, “The aggregate composed of the necessary and the contingent is contingent,” do you mean that it depends on something distinct from it, or that it depends on part of itself?

The first is false; the second is true.

But if it is said that the aggregate of contingent beings, each of which depends on something distinct from the aggregate, is itself contingent