an effect, there would be nothing among them that necessitates all the others, and thus nothing among them that could in any way be the cause of the aggregate.

If you say:

An effect of the necessary being must be independent of contingent beings, whether the necessary being brings it about through an intermediary or without one. Since the necessary being brings about the intermediary, dependence is in reality upon the necessary being, and independence is secured through it, for it brings into being the contingent beings that serve as conditions, intermediaries, or causes for others, or whatever else they may be called.

You may be told:

On this assumption, the aggregate of existing beings, which includes the being necessary in itself, does not depend upon any contingent being; rather, it depends upon the necessary being alone. Thus, your objection to this second proof fails. Whichever of the two proofs holds, the intended conclusion is established.

This reply may be summarized as follows:

If he says that the aggregate of existing beings, considered as an aggregate, is an effect of the necessary being alone, or through an intermediary, such that it cannot be said to depend upon anything other than the necessary being, then this objection—namely, that it depends upon the contingent—fails.

If he says:

It is an effect of the necessary being because the contingent is among the effects of the necessary being, while the aggregate is an effect of both the contingent and the necessary being,

then this invalidates his objection to the first proof, since the aggregate of contingent beings cannot in any way be an effect of any one of them.