For it is self-evident to reason that if the aggregate cannot bring anything into existence, necessitate its existence, act, or be an efficient cause, then a part of it is all the less capable of doing so. The aggregate includes that part; if all its parts together are insufficient to necessitate existence, act, and bring things into existence, how could a part of it suffice for that?

This is an independent proof in this discussion: if the aggregate is not an efficient cause but rather an effect dependent upon a cause, then a part of it is all the less capable of being an efficient cause; rather, it too is an effect dependent upon a cause. Thus, if the aggregate of contingent beings depends upon a producer of effects, each of its parts is all the more dependent upon a producer of effects. It therefore becomes clear that every contingent being, as well as the aggregate of contingent beings, depends upon a producer of effects. This is what was to be proved. All praise is due to Allah, and all bounty comes from Him.

[Response to the Remainder of the Objection]

As for the objector’s statement:

“We do not concede that every contingent thing needs a cause external to itself. An aggregate composed of the necessary and the contingent is itself contingent because it depends upon the contingent, yet it does not need a cause external to itself.”

[The First Response]

He may be answered as follows:

First, this doubt arises from the ambiguity of the term “aggregate”: it may mean the collective configuration itself ن, all the individual members, or the aggregate. The composite aggregate, consisting of each individual member, does not depend