the answer to his objection to all the other scenarios they have proposed concerning the need of the aggregate of contingent beings for a Necessary Existent outside that aggregate.

We shall explain this.

He says:

“One cannot argue that the aggregate of that chain is contingent n, that every contingent thing depends upon a cause external to itself, and that this aggregate therefore depends upon a cause external to itself. For we reply: We do not concede that every contingent thing needs a cause external to itself. An aggregate composed of the necessary and the contingent is itself contingent because it depends upon the contingent, yet it does not need a cause external to itself.”

The answer to this is as follows:

He himself states that “Every contingent thing depends upon a cause external to itself” is a self-evident, necessarily known proposition once it is understood. For what is meant by a contingent thing is something that does not exist by itself, but must have a cause that brings it into existence, whether this is called an agent, an efficient cause, or a producer of effects.

Accordingly, if the aggregate is contingent and does not exist by itself, it must have an originator that brings it into existence. It is known that the aggregate does not exist by itself; otherwise, it would be necessary in itself.

It is necessarily known that if the aggregate—which consists of the individual members and their combination—does not originate or bring about existence, then a part of that aggregate is all the less capable of bringing about or originating existence.