something necessary in itself, the intended conclusion is established. If, however, it is not supposed that they include anything necessary in itself, they cannot form a totality for which one of its parts is the cause, and the objection is therefore invalid.

Once the objection is invalidated, the aforementioned proof of the Necessary Existent entails what it seeks to establish—an existent that is necessary. Thus, the existence of the Necessary Existent necessarily follows.

The fundamental error in this objection, which reveals the distinction between the two cases, is this: the supposition used in the proof posits things none of which exists through itself. Rather, each depends on something else, and their coming together is likewise dependent. There is therefore nothing here but what is dependent and in need. The supposition advanced in the objection, however, posits an existent that is necessary in itself, together with contingent things that exist through it. Yet the totality, understood as the collective configuration, depends on a part of the collection, and that part is necessary in itself.

In this latter collection, then, there is one thing necessary in itself, which is the cause of all the other parts and of the totality understood as the collective configuration. The former collection, however, contains nothing necessary in itself; rather, both the parts and the totality are contingent in themselves. How, then, can the dependence of one on something external to it be equated with the dependence of the other on something external to it? Al-Hindī did not answer this.