“There is nothing like Him” [al-Shūrā: 11], and bodies are alike. Thus, if He were a body, He would have a likeness; and if He is not a body, whatever entails corporeality must be denied.

Some say instead: “The necessary consequences of corporeality must be denied.” This is not well expressed, for the existence of a consequence does not entail the existence of that which entails it, whereas negating the consequence does entail negating that which entails it. By contrast, negating what entails corporeality necessarily entails negating corporeality. Thus, everything that would entail His being a body must be denied.

Those who deny His being above creation and separate from it say: “Being above creation entails His being a body.” Those who deny the attributes conveyed in scriptural reports say: “Affirming them entails corporeality.” Those who deny the attributes altogether say: “Their existence entails corporeality.”

Moreover, corporeality is denied because it entails divisibility and composition. Every form of composition must therefore be denied: composition from existence and quiddity, from genus and differentia, from matter and form, from indivisible atoms, and from essence and attributes.

These five are what the later philosophers who deny the attributes call composition.

The point here is that revelation indicates that these things are to be denied, and that the Messengers denied them and explained the rational method that rules them out: sometimes by denying likeness, and sometimes by establishing that everything subject to change is originated.

Then, when these people said, “Setting is origination, and setting is change,” this was taken as a basis by