and it thus becomes clear that, however the matter is considered, none of the successive contingent beings is necessary, either in itself or through another, unless there is a being necessary in itself outside the contingent beings. For if every single individual is contingent, their aggregation is also contingent a fortiori, and the two together are all the more so. Each individual is independent of the collective configuration, since it exists without it. Whatever depends upon a contingent being that is itself independent of it is even more deserving of being deemed contingent.

To clarify this: suppose that every existent is an effect, brought into being and dependent, and that nothing exists except what is of this kind. This would be the case if contingent beings were supposed to have no cause necessary in itself, even without supposing that some were effects of others. Such a supposition entails that none of them exists, because they do not exist in themselves—that is precisely what has been supposed. Whatever does not exist in itself is all the more incapable of bringing another into existence. Thus none of them would exist either in itself or through another.

It is known that whatever exists does so either in itself or through another. Hence, if they are supposed to exist, while also being supposed to exist neither in themselves nor through a cause that brought them into existence, this entails affirming two contradictories together—even if something were additionally supposed to bring another into existence. What does not exist cannot bring another into existence. Thus, if none among them exists in itself, none among them would be