are valid and undermine what is used to deny His attributes. Indeed, Satan casts into their minds specious objections against the truth such that, had they encountered comparable objections against falsehood, they would not have believed that falsehood.

All this applies if by the aggregate one means the aggregation distinct from each individual. If, however, one means each individual, the matter is clearer and more evident: each individual is contingent and dependent upon an agent. If there is no aggregate distinct from the individuals, there can be nothing apart from these contingent individuals to which necessity or contingency may be ascribed.

If by the aggregate one means the combination of both—the individuals and their aggregation—then the aggregation is one of the parts of that combination. There would thus be successive parts, together with a further part consisting of their aggregation. This latter part cannot be necessary in itself, because it depends upon contingent beings and because it is an accident subsisting in something else. At best, it is comparable to composition in relation to a composite entity: if the composite is contingent in itself, then its composition is all the more so.

Indeed, it may be said that the aggregate here has no existential reality distinct from the successive individuals; rather, it has only a relational, conceptual character, like the relation between the individual members of a group of ten. This and other considerations show that it cannot be necessary in itself. This part therefore remains contingent in itself and dependent upon something else, like all the other parts. Each of them would then need a cause that brings it into existence, and so each of them needs such a cause.

The aggregate here is included in our expression “each of them,” since it is a part of this whole.