created existence distinct from the Creator’s being. His associate Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, who leaned more heavily toward philosophy, therefore drew a distinction between the Absolute (al-muṭlaq) and the particular (al-muʿayyan). Because of that philosophical bent he refused to admit that the nonexistent is “something”; instead he identified the Real with Absolute Existence and wrote the treatise The Key to the Unseen of Union and Being.

[On their negation of the Creator and their universalizing of divinity]

This position is an even deeper denial of the Creator, for “the absolute qua absolute”––the logical universal––exists only in the mind, never in concrete reality, whereas “the absolute without qualification”––the natural universal––can exist outside the mind only as a determinate individual, and, for those who claim such external existence, it is but a part of that individual. It follows that the existence of the Lord must be either absent from external reality, or merely a part of the existence of created things, or identical with the existence of created things.

But can a part create the whole? Can a thing create itself? Can non-existence generate existence? Or can one portion of a thing be the creator of the rest of it?

Consequently, they shun the term “indwelling” (ḥulūl), because it implies a dweller and a place of dwelling; and they avoid the term “union” (ittiḥād), because it implies two entities, one uniting with the other—while they insist that existence is one. They say: “The Christians only became unbelievers because they confined divinity to the Messiah. Had they universalized it, they would not have disbelieved.” Likewise, regarding idol-worshipers they say: “Their error lay in worshiping some of what is manifest and neglecting the rest; had they worshiped everything, they would not have been at fault.”