–a positive, existent act that is itself sought and commanded. Hence the very substance of a prohibition ultimately reverts to a command, for what the prohibition truly intends is the positive act implicit within it, the act the Law actually desires.

This becomes still clearer in the twelfth consideration: scholars have differed over what exactly a prohibition requires, and they have offered several views.

1. The first view holds that what is required is for a person to restrain himself from the act and hold back from it; this, they say, is a positive deed. Their proof is that legal obligation pertains only to what is within human ability, whereas sheer non-existence is not within one’s power. This is the position of the majority.

2. Abū Hāshim and others counter that what is required is simply the non-occurrence of the act. The objective, they argue, is fulfilled so long as the deed remains nonexistent, even if the thought of it never crosses the person’s mind, let alone his deliberately refraining from it. Were active restraint what was required, the person would be sinful for failing to perform that restraint. Moreover, people commend someone who does not commit an ugly deed even when the notion of it never occurs to him or of restraining himself from it. This is one of the two reports from Qāḍī Abū Bakr; on that basis he maintained that the absence of an act is within a servant’s capacity and falls under his acquisition (kasb). He said: “The purpose of the prohibition is to preserve the original state of non-existence, and that is within one’s power.”

3. A third group says that what the prohibition seeks is to perform the opposite of the forbidden act, for that opposite is what lies within one’s power and is the true aim of the one issuing the prohibition. Thus he forbade fornication in order to secure chastity—which is commanded; he forbade injustice in order to secure justice—which is commanded; he forbade lying in order to secure truthfulness—which is commanded; and so on with every prohibition. For these scholars, the essence of a prohibition is a request for the opposite of the prohibited act, so in the end the request is attached only to carrying out the commanded deed.

The sound conclusion is that what the Law seeks is of two kinds. One kind is sought for its own sake: this is the commanded act.