principle there arises the question of taḥsīn and taqbīḥ (whether reason may deem things intrinsically good or evil). We have treated this question in full in al-Miftāḥ, supplying more than fifty proofs of its soundness.” See Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿādah (2/875-891).

Second: The material embedded in the book in which Imām Ibn al-Qayyim quotes his well-known teachers.
Ibn al-Qayyim cites in this work two of his famous shaykhs:

1. Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH), whom he names repeatedly and honours greatly.
2. Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 727 AH) (1). Ibn al-Qayyim (p. 131) recounts a debate and says, “Its substance was related to me by our shaykh ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Taymiyyah—may Allah have mercy on him.”

Third: Ibn al-Qayyim’s well-known legal choices and his cross-references to his discussions of them, among which are:

1. The question of admitting the kaffārah (expiation) in an oath formulated as a divorce, and of three divorces uttered in a single statement counting as one. He writes (p. 335): “What can be stated categorically is that allowing the kaffārah in an oath of divorce, and treating three divorces pronounced in one phrase as a single divorce, is one of the two opinions in the school of Aḥmad. It is derived from his principles in the soundest possible manner. The purpose here is to refute the claim of consensus on the contrary, and a detailed treatment of this issue is found elsewhere.”
   Refer to Zād al-Maʿād (5/344-383), Ighāthat al-Lahfān (1/499-569), and Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid (3/31-38). Imām Ibn al-Qayyim upheld this position and was harmed for it, as