his command of the Arabic language. He says (pp. 572–573):

“Those who set their so-called intellects—which are in truth sheer ignorance—in opposition to the Book and the Sunnah build their case upon ambiguous, all-embracing statements that can bear several meanings. Because their wording is imprecise and their meaning equivocal, such statements are open to both truth and falsehood. Owing to the fragment of truth they contain, those who do not fully understand them accept the accompanying falsehood, duped by the confusion and obscurity; then they use that falsehood to contend with the prophetic texts. This is the very source of the misguidance that led earlier nations astray, and it is the wellspring of every innovation.”

Among the examples he cites are the following:

• His statement (pp. 583–584): “The word jism (body) is not used in revelation affirmatively, so that it would possess the sanctity of affirmation, nor is it used negatively, so that its negation would be binding. Therefore, whoever applies it—whether to affirm or to deny—must be asked what he means by it.” He then clarifies the correct and incorrect senses the term may bear.

• His remark (p. 589): “The term tarkīb (composition) is employed with five different meanings,” after which he enumerates them.

• His words (p. 575): “Tawḥīd (monotheism) is a term applied to six distinct concepts: the monotheism of the philosophers, the Jahmiyyah, the deterministic Qadariyyah, and the pantheistic Ittihādiyyah. The messengers were sent to invalidate these four kinds of ‘monotheism,’ and both reason and revelation attest to their falsity.” He then proceeds at length to demonstrate their invalidity.

Ibn al-Qayyim also obliges his opponents to concede a number of extraordinarily forceful implications, among them his statement (p. 619):

“As for the philosophers, they prove the existence of the Maker through the notion of composition: bodies are composite; whatever is composite depends on its parts; every dependent entity is contingent; and every contingent entity requires a Necessary Existent. Multiplicity within the Necessary Existent is impossible in any respect, for it would entail His being composite and dependent, both of which contradict His being necessary. This is the utmost—”