, seen (1), and even touched. They add, “This is the rule (2) for all the other attributes.”

Thus they declare that the Divine Will is one and the same in essence (3): the will to bring a thing into existence is identical with the will to annihilate it; the will to set it in motion is identical with the will to keep it still; the will to preserve it (4) is identical with the will to destroy it (5). The only difference, they claim, lies in the objects to which it is related. They say the very same about Divine Power.

When they then burrow (6) into questions such as the indivisible atom, whether an accident endures for two instants or not; the nature of bodies—are they homogeneous or heterogeneous?—the issue of states (aḥwāl), whether they are established realities or not, whether they are positive existents, mere negations, or neither; the nature of time and place—what are they in fact, and are they entities or privations?—the question ⦗ق 16 أ⦘ of acquisition (kasb), does it have any true reality or not, and, if so, what is it; and the question of action—does it inhere in the agent or not? If it does, is it concomitant with him or not? If it is subsequent, what (7) necessitates that delay? If concomitant, (8) was it eternal with His eternity? And if it does not (9) inhere in Him, how can He be an agent without (10) an act subsisting in Him—just as He cannot be hearing, seeing, or willing.