Secondly, we say: Grant, if you will, that reason does not positively prove the attributes you have denied; at the very least it does not negate them. The textual evidence (al-samʿ) is a proof fully sufficient in and of itself, and in matters of this sort the heart finds greater assurance in revelation than in bare rational speculation. What, then, entitles you to reject what those texts establish?

Thirdly, we ask: If the apparent sense of the texts entails tashbīh and tajsīm—that is, anthropomorphism and corporealism—it would entail them in every passage, so go ahead and reinterpret them all. If, however, their apparent sense does not necessitate that, it is impermissible to reinterpret any of them. And should you claim that (1) some passages do require reinterpretation while others do not, you will be asked to state a principled distinction between the two, and the challenge will come back upon you from the very beginning.

When some of you realized that no such distinction can be sustained, you said: “Whatever the scholarly consensus has affirmed—such as the Seven Attributes—is not to be reinterpreted, whereas anything on which there is no consensus may be subjected to figurative interpretation.” Yet this, as you can see, is one of the most unsound differentiations imaginable, for its import is that consensus has validated what purportedly implies corporealism and anthropomorphism; were it not for that consensus, you say, we would have reinterpreted the passages. Thus you have admitted that there is a consensus upon tashbīh and tajsīm, which would impugn the very notion of consensus, for consensus can never be established upon falsehood.

Furthermore, if a consensus has indeed formed on affirming these attributes while their apparent sense entails anthropomorphism and corporealism (2), your denial of them collapses. If no such consensus exists, the distinction you relied upon collapses instead.

Finally, your opponents among the Muʿtazilites have not concurred (3) with you in affirming these attributes.