from the mere utterance of that declaration of tanzīh (transcendence) and tawḥīd? Why did you not rather say, “I affirm for Him mercy, love, anger, pleasure, and laughter that are not of the same genus as the attributes of created beings.” (1)

If you say, “Such a notion is unintelligible,”

you will be told: “Then how did you comprehend hearing, sight, life, will, and volition that are likewise of no genus shared with the attributes of created beings?” (2)

If you then say, “I distinguish between what admits of figurative interpretation and what does not, (3) for whatever the intellect demonstrates to be established—such as knowledge, life, power, hearing, and sight—may not be re-interpreted, whereas whatever the intellect does not demonstrate must, or at least may, be re-interpreted, such as face, hand, laughter, joy, anger, and pleasure. Indeed, the well-ordered act (4) indicates the doer’s power, its perfection indicates his knowledge, and its precise specification indicates his will; hence it is impossible to contravene what plain reason attests,”

you will be answered first: “In exactly the same way, bestowing favors, showing beneficence, removing harm, and relieving afflictions all point to mercy, just as specification points to will. Showing special honor, electing, and choosing indicate love just as clearly as your examples indicate will. Conversely, humiliation, banishment, distancing, and deprivation indicate wrath and hatred just as their opposites indicate love and pleasure, and punishment, force, and retribution (5) point to anger just as surely as their opposites point to pleasure.”