and His love, pleasure, anger, joy, and laughter, re-casting them all as nothing but the very same act of will?

If you were to say, “Because (1) affirming will (irādah) and volition (mashīʾah) does not entail resemblance or corporealism, whereas affirming the real existence of those other attributes necessarily entails both—since they can only be conceived in bodies: mercy is a tenderness that overtakes the nature of an animal, love is the soul’s inclination to procure what benefits it, anger is the boiling of the blood of the heart in quest of retaliation, and joy is the expansion of the blood of the heart when something pleasing arrives,”

you would be told (2): “In exactly the same way, will itself is the soul’s inclination to bring about what benefits it and repel what harms it. Every attribute you have affirmed is, in our observation, nothing but an incidental quality inhering in bodies. Knowledge is either the imprint of the form of the known (3) upon the mind of the knower, or else an accidental property residing in him; likewise hearing, sight, and life are accidental qualities inhering in the one described. So why must resemblance and corporealism follow from affirming those attributes, yet not from affirming these?

If you then say, ‘Because (4) I affirm them in a manner that neither matches nor resembles our attributes,’

you will be answered: ‘Why, then, do you not affirm all of them in a manner that neither matches nor resembles the attributes of created beings? (5) And why did you take the very assertion of this set to imply resemblance and corporealism, while (6) you understood…’