three—so the negation amounts to a prohibition of awarding prize money for anything else, not of racing itself.
– Or he may have meant that it is impermissible to compete for anything other than these three when a stake is involved, so that the prohibition targets the very act of racing with a wager outside the three.

Accordingly, on the first interpretation the ban concerns offering prize money on anything other than the three (1); on the second, it concerns entering into a contract that stipulates a stake for something else (2). On either reading, the report calls for prohibiting prize money (3) in cases other than the three.

They further argue: anything besides these three is not needed for jihad to the same degree, cannot serve in their stead, and does not yield the same benefit; it therefore resembles mere games on which wagering is not allowed.

Those who permit offering a stake reply by drawing an analogy between the foot and the hoof or padded sole: each involves a race—this one conducted by the competitor himself, that one by means of his mount.

They add: just as camel and horse races cultivate horsemanship and courage, so too foot races, for they train the body in movement, agility, speed, and vigor—qualities that are (4) desirable for jihad (5).