for it is simply an additional amount that becomes attached to the collateral, and is therefore permissible just as one may attach an additional amount (1) to the guarantor’s liability. The distinction that the guarantor’s liability is broad while the collateral is narrow carries no weight, for the two parties may enlarge the collateral many times over by substituting another item; were the collateral not capable of expansion, such substitution would be impossible.

Our jurists have also said: if a pledged slave commits an offense that incurs financial liability, and the mortgagee pays the indemnity so that the slave remains pledged for both the indemnity and the original debt, that is permissible. This, too, is an increase in the debt secured by the collateral.

They nevertheless differentiate this increase from other kinds, arguing that once an offense occurs the injured party gains the right to demand that the slave be sold (2) to cover the indemnity, thereby nullifying the security of the pledge. The situation thus resembles a pledge that has not yet been delivered, which is non-binding; and before a pledge becomes binding one may add to the debt it secures. The same ruling applies after an offense, because the pledge is now exposed to lapsing.

They further state that the case is different when nothing has disturbed the pledge, for then it is binding and there is no way to annul the mortgagee’s right in it. Consequently it is invalid to pledge the same item for another debt, just as it would be invalid to pledge it to a second creditor.

Finally, they say that the whole of the pledged property is already bound for every part of the debt, leaving no room for a second claim to attach to it (3). This contrasts with suretyship, whose locus is the guarantor’s liability, a domain spacious enough to accept any number of debts that may be imposed upon it (4).