The Shāfiʿī jurists outline two methodological approaches to determine where the two opinions apply (1).

1. The first approach holds that the two opinions run through every possible form of the contract, whether the prize money is furnished by both parties, by one of them, or by a third party.

2. The second approach limits the disagreement to the party who actually puts up the stake. As for the muhallil—the neutral competitor—and anyone who contributes no stake, the contract is, by unanimous agreement, merely permissible and revocable in their case.

Adherents of this second approach argue that making the contract binding for someone who has staked nothing serves no purpose, for such a person either wins money (2) or pays nothing at all; compelling him to abide by a contract in which he is a receiver rather than a giver is therefore pointless.

The proponents of the first approach reply that the one who furnishes the stake may benefit by learning from the participant who offers no stake; it is as though he were paying for instruction, so the other party must uphold the contract. They add that one of the conditions for validity is that both the consideration and the counter-consideration be known; therefore the contract is binding, just like a lease.

Those who maintain that the contract is merely permissible, not binding, argue that a race is a contract whose object lies beyond the participant’s power to deliver, making it non-binding—like a reward offered for returning a runaway slave. Its subject is hitting the mark, something outside his control, and in that respect it differs from a lease.