permissible, for he gains no benefit thereby.

They also argue that it contains an element of gambling: the participant will either incur a loss or escape loss, and that is precisely the nature of gambling. By contrast, when the reward is offered by a third-party sponsor, that sponsor inevitably bears the loss.

Consequently, the sponsor is obliged to pay the sum he pledged to the winner, because he promised it (1) for work that has in fact been carried out, just as he is obliged to do so in analogous cases.

They add that this conclusion is even more binding according to the principles of the scholars of Medina, for they hold that fulfilling a promise becomes obligatory whenever it involves an explicit commitment. Thus, if someone says to another, “Marry and I will pay your dowry,” or “Take a loan and eat, and I will settle it for you,” and the like, the promise is unquestionably binding in their view—whereas our school holds otherwise (2).

If the promise does not contain such an affirmation, the jurists differ. Proponents of the present position maintain: whenever the sponsor must pay in every case, he is truly a sponsor; but whenever the matter vacillates between two outcomes, he is a gambler—whether it swings between gain and loss, loss and breaking even, or gain and breaking even—for in their definition gambling is any transaction that involves risk.

What has already been set forth (3) regarding this argument when the points invalidating the muhallil (4) were discussed is sufficient.