and shibāk; this is even more deserving of prohibition.

The Ḥanafīs say that restricting the wording of the ḥadith to these three does not negate the permissibility of prize-money in other cases. The Prophet’s statement, “No prize-money except in a camel’s hoof, a horse’s hoof, or an arrow-head,” means: no fully beneficial, legitimate prize-money and the like. Offering the prize falls under jaʿālah (a reward-based contract), and such a contract is valid for every lawful activity for which a reward may be promised; thus the agreement is a jaʿālah and is not limited to the three.

Al-Jawzajānī relates in his book al-Mutarjam: “An-Nufaylī narrated to us—Yaḥyā ibn Yamān (1) from Ibn Jurayj—who said that ʿAṭāʾ declared, ‘Prize-money may be offered in every activity.’” He placed this report in the chapter he entitled “Competitions for which prize-money is permissible.”

Accordingly, Abū Ḥanīfah’s school is the most expansive in this regard, followed by al-Shāfiʿī’s. The Mālikī school is the narrowest (2), with Aḥmad’s coming next.

Abū Ḥanīfah’s position would be the proper analogy if the sanctioned prize-money truly belongs to the genus of jaʿālah. Most of those who differ with him nonetheless concede that it is a form of jaʿālah (3). Hence the Ḥanafīs compelled them to allow prize-money in the very cases they had prohibited, for they had drawn no substantial distinction. In reply, they argued against the Ḥanafīs that, were it genuinely a jaʿālah, the presence of a muḥallil (a third contestant who puts up no stake) would not be required when the prize is provided by the two competitors—just as it is not required in