it proves to be a consequential distinction, and we are just as ready to reject it if it proves inconsequential.

They add: Moreover, every time the muḥallil enters the equation of profit and loss, the level of risk rises—and it rises for the two racers as well. When there are only the original two, each stakes his fortune against a single opponent, his equal. Once the outsider is introduced, each must contend with two rivals: his peer and the unsolicited intruder. Before the muḥallil arrived, either of them could profit by defeating only one man; after his arrival, no one gains anything unless he defeats two. There is no doubt that the smaller the risk, the stronger the case for permissibility.

How, then, can the contract in which the risk is greater be declared lawful, while the one that carries less risk and is nearer to the purpose intended by the Lawgiver and the two bettors is pronounced forbidden? Such a ruling finds no place in the perfect Sharīʿah.

They also argue: For wealth to become lawfully taken, the one who parts with it must do so willingly (1); for the Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “The property of a Muslim is not lawful to take except with his willing consent.” (2)