to one party only—namely his opponent. Once the muḥallil (1) is admitted, however, he now foresees the possibility of forfeiting his stake to the other contestant, to the muḥallil, or to both of them together. How, then, can it be said that a contract in which a man’s money may go to any of three possible beneficiaries—this one alone, that one alone, or the two combined—is permissible, while the contract in which his loss can fall to but a single person is forbidden?!

It is self-evident that the occurrence of one out of three events is more likely than that of one specific event; accordingly, once the muḥallil is present, the avenues through which either contestant may lose his stake are twice as many as they were without him. How, then, can this be declared lawful while the other is ruled unlawful? Should it not be exactly the reverse?

They further argue: if it is impermissible for either of the two to take the other’s money when they have both contributed to the stake—such that devouring that wealth would be devouring it unlawfully (2)—then how can it be permissible for each of them to eat the other’s wealth once this borrowed interloper appears, and for that consumption to be deemed lawful, when in fact they gain nothing from his presence but the loss of their own money and the certainty of deprivation? Even should they defeat him, they would take no pleasure in doing so. Yet when someone steps in between them who takes their wealth and gives them nothing, you pronounce the contract valid; whereas if they are left to themselves, share the stake equally, exert equal effort, and each simply awaits whatever destiny may allot him (3), you forbid it!

They also say: moreover, when the two contestants both put up stakes, each is at once a giver and a taker. But when this third person enters between them, he comes in as a taker who gives nothing; then if