is present in exactly the same form when both contestants put up the stake, so the ruling must hold wherever its underlying cause holds.

They added: What makes this clearer is that nothing stands in the way of extending the ruling—for the reasons set out above—while the factor that demands it is present. Hence we must affirm what a cause, unopposed by any counter-argument, entails.

• They further said (1): If the reason for prohibition when the two share the stake is the element of risk, that reason collapses, for the ruling fails to accompany it in the scenario where a muḥallil (neutral third participant) joins the race. In that case one may reply: discarding the cause because of its failure alongside the muḥallil is no more justified than upholding it when the muḥallil is absent.

• They also said: The muḥallil’s impact must be one of two things: either he removes the cause that calls for prohibition, or he removes the ruling itself—namely, the prohibition—while the cause remains, as with the dispensation that allows a desperate person to eat carrion, blood, or pork. Both options are untenable.

As for the first, the prohibitive cause in your view is the element of risk, and that risk is not eliminated by the presence of a muḥallil.

As for the second, it too is invalid, for it entails that the ruling is severed from its cause even though the very attribute that made the cause effective is still present.

So if you say, “Once the muḥallil enters, the contract becomes a true exchange and thus exits the realm of gambling,” our answer comes from two directions: