The second: that he receive nothing if he happens to win.

Now, when both contestants contribute the stake together, sound reason (1) dictates that each of them should pay it when he loses and collect it when he prevails. Yet you have allowed a man to offer the reward in the very situation from which he derives no benefit, while forbidding him to offer it in the situation from which he hopes (2) to benefit. In other words, you permit him to pledge it in a contract that yields him nothing, but you forbid him to pledge it in a contract from which he stands to gain. Clearly, what you have prohibited is more deserving of permissibility than what you have allowed, and the very condition you have set down for legitimacy is closer (3) to being an impediment to it.

They also said: Moreover, if—when both contestants pay in without a third “legalizing” entrant (the muhallil)—one of them is said to be consuming the other’s property unlawfully, then the muhallil’s consuming their property is even more certain and obvious.

Here is the proof: either contestant only takes the other’s money when he defeats him, doing so in exactly the same manner by which the other would have taken his had he won. Both are equal in what they contribute, in the prospect of gain and loss, and in the effort expended. The muhallil, however, takes both their stakes if he outstrips them, whereas they take nothing of his if they outstrip him. Thus neither of them receives his money (4) when he is defeated, yet he takes both of theirs when he triumphs. If this is not the unlawful consumption of wealth, then the scenario you have prohibited is even less so; and if that scenario does involve unlawful consumption, then this one involves it all the more.