“…definitive proof (dalil qat’i), yet the pious person is inclined to accept as established whatever the textual evidence (dalil sam’i) indicates, even if it is not conclusive. And if the content of the revealed law conveyed to us (al-shar‘ al-muttasil binā) appears to conflict with a conclusion of reason, it is categorically rejected on the grounds that the shari‘a does not contradict reason. In this category, neither definitive nor obscure transmitted proof can be imagined.” As for al-Rāzī, we find him stating in his book Usūl al-Taqdīs (Foundations of Sanctification), pp. 172–173: “Know that when the conclusive rational proofs establish the truth of something, and then we encounter transmitted evidences whose apparent meaning suggests the opposite, there are only four possible scenarios: …” After examining these and demonstrating their collapse, he says: “When the four possibilities are invalidated, there remains nothing but to affirm, by virtue of the conclusive rational proofs, that these transmitted proofs are either false, or true but not in accordance with their apparent meaning. We then permit allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl) and undertake, as a voluntary effort, to set forth these interpretations in detail; and if interpretation is not permissible, we leave their knowledge to God Almighty. This is the universal principle (al-qānūn al-kullī) to which one resorts in ambiguous matters.” Al-Rāzī’s articulation of this universal principle also appears in his works such as Nihāyat al-‘Uqūl fī Dirāyat al-Uṣūl (manuscript, folio 14) and Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wa al-Muta’akhkhirīn, p. 51. (1) In the original manuscript: “wa minhum man akhtha’tumūhā” (“and among them those from whom you acquired it”). The passage reads coherently without this addition, as in manuscripts S and T. (2) In Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā 14:349, the Shaykh (may God have mercy on him) attributes this statement to Abū Ismā‘īl al-Harawī. (3) In al-Fatāwā 14:349, the Shaykh (may God have mercy on him) says: “Some people say, ‘The Mu‘tazilites are the khunuth of the philosophers.’ al-Ash‘arī and others have mentioned this either because the author was unaware that Jahm had preceded these thinkers in this principle, or because they resemble the philosophers in some respects; otherwise, their divergence from the philosophers is very great.” The meaning here is that they imitated them and followed their example. See Taj al-‘Arūs by al-Zubaydī, vol. 1, s.v. khunth.