As for those who claim that stillness is merely privative, they hold that the absence of motion in a subject does not necessitate the presence of some positive, existent stillness.
Accordingly, whoever maintains—as do the Karrāmiyyah and others—that motion or other temporal events may arise in a being after previously not existing, while also insisting on the impossibility of an infinite regress of events, will say: when motion arises in that being, the arising of motion does not negate some positive state of stillness. In their view this is just like the joint assertion they share with the Muʿtazilah, the Ashʿarīs, and others that He acts after not having been an actor, yet they do not hold that the absence of action is itself a positive reality; the same analysis applies, for them, to motion.
Many scholastic theologians used to say: “Whatever is never free of temporal events is itself originated,” or, “Whatever is not prior to temporal events is originated.” They considered this an obvious premise: whatever is not prior to a temporal event must either accompany it or come after it; whatever accompanies a temporal event is originated, and whatever comes after it is likewise originated ⦗1⦘.
The Shaykh—may Allah have mercy on him—points out that this statement is ambiguous. If by it they mean a being that is never free of a specific temporal event, or that is not prior to that particular event, the claim is undeniably correct and undisputed. The same holds if by “temporal event” they intend the totality of things that have a beginning or that come into existence after non-existence, and so forth.
However, if by “temporal events” they mean occurrences that follow one another without a first, and then say, “Whatever is not free of them is originated,” such a proposition is neither obvious nor self-evident. Indeed, many minds have found this issue perplexing, and it has generated extensive debate and contention.
For this reason, those who argue, “Whatever is never free of temporal events is originated,” realized that their proof cannot succeed unless they first establish the impossibility of temporal events without a beginning.
This is the very argument upon which many polemicists relied to prove that the universe is originated, and on which basis they went on to deny the divine attributes ⦗2⦘, considering it the sole valid proof—indeed,