—attributes that are not additional to the Essence—and they also say: “The Word is knowledge; it is not the speech of Allah, for His speech is an attribute of action and therefore created.” In this they echo the stance of the attribute-negators among the Jahmiyyah, the Muʿtazilah, and the like. This is, in fact, the view held by some of them—those whom the Jahmite theologians debated among the Nestorians and others, as well as those who philosophized along the lines of the attribute-denying philosophers and their ilk. Otherwise, there is no doubt that the Christians do affirm the attributes—indeed, to an extreme degree—just as among the Jews there are both affirmers and deniers.
The point here is that they call knowledge “the Word,” while withholding that designation from the speech that is truly speech; moreover, that knowledge is not something (1) intelligible in the way that the attributes inhering in a subject are conceived.
Those who maintain that speech is merely a meaning subsisting in the soul, to the exclusion of the speech that is actually uttered, resemble them; [then that meaning is not what is understood from the various senses of speech, so they distorted the very term “speech”] (2) and its reality, just as the Christians distorted the term “Word” and its reality. What I have mentioned of the resemblance between these people and the Christians in certain respects is something I later found others had already noted.
Abu al-Hasan ibn al-Zaghūnī (3) said, in the discussion of the unity of speech: “Another argument may be put to them: What difference is there between your claim that command and prohibition are two yet one—a claim you deem sound and possible—and the claim of someone who says that the Word, the humanity, and the divinity are three yet one? We are all agreed that such a statement is reprehensible both according to the Sacred Law and to reason, for the Word (4) is other than the humanity and the divinity, and likewise the other two are attribute and meaning, just as command differs from prohibition in both attribute and meaning.”