realities; therefore, the existence of each reality is dependent upon it and cannot (1) subsist without it, just as none of the other accidents that inhere in that reality can exist without it. And just as the accident inhering in one reality cannot possibly be the very same accident inhering in another, contrary reality, so the existence (2) that pertains to this reality is even more emphatically not identical to the existence that inheres in that other reality. This is obvious.

The seventy-fourth angle:
Were the matter about which they vacillate in doubt to prove sound and be affirmed decisively, its utmost implication would be that speech could be both multiple and one at the same time—two realities yet a single entity. But to eliminate every trace of multiplicity from it is impossible, for if one and the same existence were shared by two realities—and some have claimed that an attribute may comprise distinct realities—then it necessarily follows that the attribute would be both different realities and one thing. Yet these people deny that a single meaning subsisting in the mind can be multiple realities; hence their claim is manifestly corrupt under every consideration.

All of this is said only by way of concession, assuming the validity of the ḥāl and that a thing’s external existence is something added to its intrinsic realities. Otherwise, their doctrine is among the most unsound of views, first contrived by certain Muʿtazilites who contend that what is non-existent is nevertheless a “thing” in the external world; any argument built on that premise is invalid.

The seventy-fifth angle:
Grant, for the sake of argument, that speech could be a single meaning (3), just as you claim that knowledge can be one—what proof (4) is there that God does not possess