Nor do they have in mind (1) the actual language-coiners themselves; instead, they argue that speech is a single reality on the grounds that a coiner may assign one word to several (2) meanings—but what has this to do with that?! The denotation (3) of a word for a meaning follows the speaker’s intention and will: by intention and will this word conveys this meaning, and that word (4) conveys that meaning—not because (5) the word possesses that signification in and of itself or by its very nature. Scholars have differed over whether there is an affinity between word and meaning for which the coiners chose this word for that meaning. There are two opinions. The sounder maintains that some affinity is indispensable, yet it is not naturally compelling (6); it therefore varies from nation to nation. It is merely an encouraging affinity, and such affinities diversify with the diversity of peoples, just as voluntary actions differ. If one were to claim that the linkage is natural, the natures of nations themselves differ, both in their voluntary and involuntary dispositions.

Hence it becomes clear that the example they have put forward is far removed from what they intend. What they cited concerns a single term that denotes several (7) meanings, and no one disputes that. Their real concern is whether the very meanings themselves—the true realities corresponding to each meaning—are, in themselves, one single thing. That cannot be established by the intention (8) of any coiner, nor by his will (9), nor by his act of coinage. The possibility at issue here is not the possibility of turning this into that; rather, it is purely a matter of conceptual possibility.