Nor will people of that school admit that such a use is identical with the word’s very meaning; for it is that meaning taken by itself together with something in addition. Just as, in their view, a part of a thing is not something other than the thing, so the thing itself does not become other than itself merely because something is added to it—especially when what is added is of the same kind. Our aim here is not to exhaust discussion of this issue; it is only to expose the reality of the proof they advance. The example they cite in effect supposes that a single expression is coined for a command, a prohibition, and a report, and that the speaker intends, by addressing it, to make each meaning understood by an interlocutor other than the first. Intellectually this is conceivable, but it has nothing to do with what they have claimed about speech. The dispute is not over whether a single term can denote diverse realities—no one contests that, and there is no need to illustrate it. Indeed, the fact that coined expressions—whether declarative or imperative—signify diverse realities is exceedingly common (1). Rather, the disagreement concerns the various meanings conveyed by all the words Allah has revealed: are they a single meaning (2)? In other words, do the apprehended meanings of these expressions—Allah’s command to do such-and-such, or His command (3) to do such-and-such; His prohibition (4) of such-and-such, and His prohibition of such-and-such (5); His report (6) about such-and-such, and His report about such-and-such (7)—constitute one and the same thing? Meanings are not bound to the coinage of any coiner. What is astonishing is that when these people argue that speech is a meaning residing in the mind, they assert that the purport of verbal and gestural expressions does not vary with the diversity of languages.