for (1) both meanings are permissible; rather, the impediment (2) concerns linguistic convention. (3) The masters of the language coined the word for this meaning alone and for that meaning alone, so using it for both meanings together (4) amounts to employing it outside the sense for which it was coined. Hence the stronger view is that of those who permit the usage, for employing the term for both senses (5) ultimately constitutes using it in a sense other than that for which it was coined—and this is allowable (6) by way of majāz (figurative usage). Nothing prevents the speakers of the language from resorting to a word figuratively outside its literal locus.

Yet the blanket claim that such a use is “outside its proper sense” is itself disputed, just as scholars differ over whether employing a general term with a specific intent, or using the imperative form to indicate recommendation and the like, should be classed as usage beyond the original designation.

Certain groups maintain: “Part of the meaning is not something separate from the meaning itself,” and therefore they do not regard such usage as outside its proper sense, nor do they label the word thereby figurative. This is the view of leading authorities among the followers of al-Shafi‘i and Ahmad—such as Qadi Abu Ya‘la, Abu al-Tayyib, and others.

Employing a homonymous word in both of its meanings is the very opposite of employing a general term for only part of what it covers, for the word was coined for this meaning on its own and for that meaning on its own, and both senses are thereby combined (7)—unlike using a general term for only part of its meaning (8).