(4) On the impermissibility of employing a polysemous singular term to convey its multiple senses in aggregation. Al-Shâfi‘î and Qâḍî Abû Bakr (may God be pleased with them) maintained that such use is permissible—a view also adopted by al-Jubâ’î and Qâḍî ‘Abd al-Jabbâr ibn Aḥmad. Others, namely Abû Hâshim, Abû al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrî, and al-Karkhî, asserted its prohibition. Among them there was further divergence: some forbade it on grounds relating to the speaker’s intention (qasd), others on grounds relating to the linguistic convention (waḍ‘)—the latter being the preferred position. After outlining this discussion in his previous source (pp. 373–374), he argues: “The proof for our stance is as follows. When a legislator assigns a single term to two concepts exclusively, he must either intend it for their aggregate or for each concept individually. If one denies that he intended it for the aggregate, then using it to denote the aggregate constitutes a use other than that which he intended—and hence is impermissible. If one concedes that he did intend it for the aggregate, two options remain: the term is used either to signify the aggregate alone or to signify both the aggregate and the individual concepts. If it is used only for the aggregate, then it effectively signifies only one of its meanings; for if the legislator’s assignment covered three referents in apposition—one of which is the aggregate—then using the term for that single referent does not count as using it for each of its individual senses. If, on the other hand, you claim it is used to convey both the aggregate and the individuals simultaneously, this is impossible: to convey the aggregate means that sufficiency is achieved only by including all referents, whereas to convey an individual concept means that sufficiency is achieved by any one referent alone—this would be a combination of opposites and thus contradictory. It follows that a polysemous term, precisely because of its plurality of meanings, cannot be employed to convey those meanings in aggregate.” Abû ‘Abd Allâh al-Râzî then presents, in the same source (pp. 375–394), the arguments of those who permit such use and refutes them based on his chosen view. For a detailed treatment of this issue, see: – al-Amîdî, Iḥkâm al-Aḥkâm, vols. 1:19–22 and 2:342–346. – Abû al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrî, al-Mu‘tamid fî Uṣûl al-Fiqh, vol. 1:17–18.