This, then, is the statement of the one who cites that proof in order to show its corruption and invalidity, and that is sufficient.

Sixty-eighth Point:
It may be said: upon reflection, this proof is among the most unsound of arguments, for the parable that has been advanced (1) does no more than show that a single wording can be shared between the meanings of a command, a prohibition, and a report. It is like the saying, “Woe unto you,” which has been described as both supplication and statement. There is no doubt that one and the same form may at times be intended as a command (2) and at other times as a report—for example, when someone says, “May Allah forgive so-and-so, have mercy on him (3), treat him kindly, admit him into Paradise, shield him from the Fire, and bestow on him immense blessings.” In origin this is a declarative sentence, yet it is widely used as a supplication, which is a request. Likewise, the form “Do!” (ifʿal) is originally an imperative, but it can convey prohibition or threat, as has been said regarding His words: “Do whatever you wish; indeed, He is Seeing of what you do.” (4)

The question, however, is whether it is permissible for a single homonymous word, shared between two meanings—be they command and report, command and prohibition, or the like—to be intended for both meanings simultaneously. There is a famous dispute over this among jurists, scholars of legal theory, and others. The disagreement is well known within the schools of Ahmad, al-Shafiʿi, Malik, and others, among the Muʿtazilites themselves (5), and likewise among the Ashʿarites (6); and al-Razi adopts the view that such simultaneity is impermissible, in agreement with Abu—